State v. Weber - Pretextual Stops and Standards of Review

Division Three recently issued State v. Weber, a case involving the issues of pretextual stops and the correct standard of review when a superior court reviews a district's court's suppression hearing.

A State Trooper was on patrol early in the morning at about 3:00 A.M. He noticed a car, driven by Weber, was speeding and had failed to stop before crossing over a sidewalk. The trooper pulled Weber over. Weber was intoxicated and was arrested for DUI.

At the suppression hearing, Weber argued that the stop was pretextual. A pretexual stop occurs when the State stops a person for violating the law, such as the traffic code, but the motivation to stop the person is not actually for the legal violation. Pretextual stops are illegal under Article 1, Section 7.  State v. Ladson.  This is one area where Article 1, Section 7 provides greater protection than under the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment does not forbid the police from making pretextual stops.

The district court found that the stop was pretextual. In essence, the stop was a pretext to see if Weber was intoxicated.

The superior court, sitting as a reviewing court, disagreed and reversed the district court, saying that there was sufficient evidence to reverse.

Division Three accepted discretionary review.  The court affirms. While the superior court apparently applied the wrong standard of review, the appellate court reasons there was no factual basis for the district court to find that a pretextual stop had occurred.

Judge Sweeney dissented. He thought the superior court had overstepped its role as a reviewing court by weighing the evidence. He concluded that there was sufficient evidence supporting the district's court holding that a pretextual stop had occurred and would have reversed the superior court.